lust
I've been meaning to read up on the Seven Deadly Sins for a while now, and only just recently got to start this series.
I decided to start out by reading about Lust, seeing as how I know almost nothing about it, and have virtually no - cough - experience with it at all. Actually, it just seemed to be the most intriguing book on the shelf at the moment. Not to mention, the enticing little toe there...
Anyway, I had hoped that this little book would provide me with a real grappling with the meat of the matter, but right from the get go, Blackburn tells me that he's not going to write about the sin of lust, but instead that because lust has been maligned, he will "speak up for lust." Ok, fair enough, I think. Speak up for Lust and give me the Devil's Advocate version of why this is a good thing. From that I can infer why it's bad.
Now, normally, from a book listed as a "philosophy" book, I expect the author to start spewing opinions right away. Instead, Blackburn gave a rundown on all the different ways that humans have portrayed or maligned lust in the past. Beginning with the Greeks, and moving on to the Romans, Middle Ages, and the Christian response to Lust, Blackburn just gives us what everyone else thought about the subject, rather than explaining what he himself thinks about the whole thing. At least not until he gets to Thomas Hobbes, and takes a thought originally presented by Hobbes, and coins a nifty phrase called "Hobbesian Unity."
What is this Hobbesian Unity? Well, it starts out with this quote:
The appetite which men call LUST... is a sensual pleasure, but not only that: there is in it also a delight of the mind: for it consisteth of two appetites together, to please, and to be pleased; and the delight men take in delighting, is not sensual, but a pleasure or joy of the mind, consisting in the imagination of the power they have so much to please. (quoting Hobbes, pp. 87-88)
Blackburn enjoys this idea, because it sets up a "feedback loop," where person A pleases person B, who wants to please person A back again, and it just goes on and on until you reach a point of "pure mutuality" in which there are no "hidden agendas, mistakes, or deceptions." This then, is Hobbesian Unity, and something people should strive for (pp. 88). All well and good, I think. If you're talking about shared sexual pleasure.
Blackburn then goes on to discuss the contrary side of this Hobbesian Unity, which is the non-mutual seeking of self-pleasure over against the idea of "pure mutuality." In this realm, the object of sexual desire becomes just that, an object, and is used and thrown out, "as one throws away a lemon that is sucked dry" (quoting Kant, pp. 94). What follows from here is a discussion of the psychology of Objectification and one of the nature of Substitution. The Substitution stuff is interesting, really, and it ends up making lust sound not so bad.
Here's the gist of it: The argument is that lust focuses on Substitution: object X is as good as object Y when it comes to release. Of course, a lonely man most often will not simply jump in bed with any woman, purely for the release of his desires. Instead, he pines about until he finds one which excites his desire, and one with which he can find that release, which is usually based on some sense of what this individual might provide in terms of pleasure. So the absolute idea that one object is as good as the other is not quite right. A similar argument is made for pornography: it is a substitution of images for the real. Now, here is where the argument gets good; the objections for pornography are not images themselves, but the depictions of the individuals in that pornography which creates a false representation of the person's availability and desire to please. In other words, it blurs the lines between reality and fantasy, suggesting a mutual pleasure where there is none.
Sounding familiar? It should. The argument is that all of these objects or people are intended to excite the imagination. Hmmm... Hobbes' idea. Anyone with enough self-awareness, and enough desire for the reality of Hobbesian Unity ought to refrain from these things which fall short of that unity. By inference, then, anything that does not strive for that Unity ought to be labeled as Lust (Blackburn doesn't quite say it like that, but that's the flipside). What I can take away from all this is that Blackburn didn't really describe Lust, but instead defined the goal of Sexual Desire, and urged people to strive for that Unity. Lust is anything that sidesteps that goal at the expense of the Unity. How exactly that is speaking up for lust I'm not sure, but it certainly speaks up for shared pleasure.
All in all, a decent read.
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